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RECENT DECISIONS
CORPORATIONS-PRoPERTY DIVIDENDS-TRuSTS.-The Direc-
tors of the Distilling Corporation of Virginia adopted a resolution
declaring a dividend on common stock payable in warehouse receipts
for whiskey. Anticipating a repeal of the Prohibition Amendment,
payment was deferred for about two years. Within this two-year
period a holder of both preferred and common shares died and his
executors exchanged his preferred holdings for a larger number of
the common. The life beneficiary contended that the Personal Prop-
erty Law 1 required a holding that the dividends were income. Held,
where executors have exchanged preferred shares constituting a part
of the capital of an estate for common shares and have received
thereon dividends which were declared before decedent's death, both
the common shares and the dividends thereon must be accounted for
as capital and not as income. In re Wolfe's Estate, 155 Misc. 190,
279 N. Y. Supp. 605 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
Property dividends are a source of discomfort to the stockholder
whose holdings are extensive, for he must find a ready market in
order to avoid insurance and storage costs. Yet, they are not against
public policy and no objection can invalidate them.2 The Board of
Directors in their discretion can declare a cash, stock or property
dividend.3 To rule otherwise would be to interfere with the internal
management of a corporation which the courts are loath to do in the
absence of fraud or illegality,4 It is true, the stockholders cannot
be compelled to receive property dividends, and in that event the
corporation must retain, the same and if possible sell them for the
stockholders. 5
The declaration of a dividend does not create a contractual re-
lationship but instead there arises a debt in the stockholder's favor
against the corporation. 6 If payable in cash, the corporation is bound
'N. Y. PERS. PROP LAW (1931) § 17B: "Unless otherwise expressly pro-
vided by the will of a person dying after this act takes effect, all income from
real and personal property earned during the period of administration of the
estate of such testator and not payable to others or otherwise disposed of by
the will shall be distributed pro rata as income among the beneficiaries of any
trusts created out of the residuary estate of such testator and the other persons
entitled to such residuary estate. * * *"
' Venner v. Southern Pacific Co., 279 Fed. 832 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
'Earl, J., in the case of Williams v. Western U. Tel. Co., 93 N. Y. 162
(1883), wrote: "There is no rule of law or reason founded upon public policy
which condemns a property dividend. The directors could convert the property
into cash before a dividend and divide that, so the stockholders can take the
property divided to them and sell it and then realize the cash." In re Kernochan,
104 N. Y. 618, 11 N. E. 149 (1887); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Ernst,
263 N. Y. 342, 189 N. E. 241 (1934); BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS (1st ed.
1927) § 159.
'Liebman v. Auto Strop Co., 212 App. Div. 306, 208 N. Y. Supp. 589,
off'd, 241 N. Y. 427, 150 N. E. 505 (1926) ; A. Rosen & Sons, Inc. v. Silverman,
235 App. Div. 524. 258 N. Y. Supp. 15 (lst Dept. 1932): Musson v. N. Y. etc.,
Electric Lights, etc., 138 Misc. 881, 247 N. Y. Supp. 406 (1931).5 Williams v. Western U. Tel. Co.. 93 N. Y. 162 (1883).
"Ehle v. Chittenango, 24 N. Y. 548 (1862); Searles v. Gebbie. 115 App.
Div. 778, 101 N. Y. Supp. 199, aff'd, 190 N. Y. 533, 83 N. E. 1131 (1907);
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to discharge this debt in lawful currency.7 After dividends are de-
clared out of surplus, such dividend becomes the property of the
stockholders irrespective of the time of payment.8 If the directors
provide in their resolution that the dividend shall be payable to the
holders of record on a certain day they may do so to protect the
corporation in paying to holders of record when they have no notice
of transfer.9 By this provision title is not affected.10
If the preferred stock is part of the capital assets of an estate,
it must follow that the common stock received in exchange in addi-
tion to the dividend declared thereon before decedent's death must
be substituted for the preferred shares, i. e., capital assets."
M. E. McC.
EVIDENCE-NEGLIGENCE-VIOLATION OF CITY ORDINANCE-
SOME EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE CAuSE.-Plaintiff's
intestate, a member of the New York City Fire Department, in re-
sponding to an alarm, placed a ladder to the scaffolding on the un-
finished side of a burning building. As the plaintiff's intestate
stepped from the ladder to the platform of the scaffolding, his foot
came in contact with a live wire and he was electrocuted. At the
time the defendant company erected its high tension wires the lot
was vacant. The wires were so hung that when the building con-
struction began they crossed over the private property and were
within the building line. When the walls of the building approached
the wires, one of the building employees raised the wires about eight
feet above the scaffolding by means of a wooden strut. A rain storm
soaked the strut, short-circuited the wires and they fell to the scaf-
folding. At the trial, the judge excluded evidence of a city ordinance
requiring line wires to be at least eight feet from the nearest point
Cogswell v. Second Nat. Bank, 78 Conn. 75, 60 Atl. 1059 (1905), aff'd sub nor,
Jerome v. Cogswell, 204 U. S. 1, 27 Sup. Ct. 241 (1906) ; Green v. Bissell, 79
Conn. 547, 65 Atl. 1056 (1907).
'Williams v. Western U. Tel. Co., 93 N. Y. 162 (1883); Grants Pass
Hardware Co. v. Calvert, 71 Ore. 103, 142 Pac. 569 (1914).
'Brundage v. Brundage, 60 N. Y. 544 (1875) ; In re Kernochan, 104 N. Y.
618, 11 N. E. 149 (1887) ; Hoffer v. Sage, 112 N. Y. 530, 20 N. E. 350 (1889) ;
Robertson v. De Brulatdur, 188 N. Y. 30, 80 N. E. 938 (1907) ; Hill v.
Newichanwanich Co., 8 Hun 459, aff'd, 71 N. Y. 593 (1887); Rowe v. White,
112 App. Div. 688, aff'd, 189 N. Y. 523, 82 N. E. 1132 (1907); Warner v.
Watson & Gibson, 4 Misc. 12, 23 N. Y. Supp. 922 (Sup. Ct. 1893).
Brisbane v. D. L. & W. R. R., 25 Hun 438, 94 N. Y. 204 (1883).
"Jones v. Terra Haute etc. Ry., 57 N. Y. 196 (1874) ; Brisbane v. D. L.
& W. R. R., 25 Hun 438, 94 N. Y. 204 (1893); Robertson v. De Brulatour,
188 N. Y. 30, 80 N. E. 938 (1907).
" In. re Osborn, 209 N. Y. 450, 103 N. E. 723 (1913) ; Pratt v. Ladd, 253
N. Y .213, 170 N. E. 895 (1930).
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